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              | Date: 2002-03-10 
 
 RU: Ein Provider gegen SORM-.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.-
 
 Es ist ein ziemlich einsamer, aber höchst erfolgreicher Kampf, den Nail
 Murzakhanov - siehe den attachierten Bericht der Washington Post - gegen
 den russischen Staat und dessen Geheimdienste führt.
 
 http://www.quintessenz.at/archiv/msg01352.html
 http://www.hro.org/2000/bulletin/eindex.htm
 
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 Nail Murzakhanov, an Internet provider in Volgograd, knew he might lose his
 business license four years ago when he told the Federal Security Service,
 Russia's domestic intelligence agency, that he would not give it access to
 the e-mail traffic of his 1,500 subscribers.
 
 When the Communications Ministry suspended his license for failure to
 cooperate with the intelligence agency, known as the FSB, Murzakhanov
 filed suit.
 
 Surprisingly, in August 2000, he got his license back. "In the end, I was left
 in peace," he said in a phone call from an office filled with brightly colored
 computer games.
 
 The standoff was surprising not so much because Murzakhanov won, but
 because it occurred at all. Typically, Internet providers in Russia say they do
 all they can to satisfy the state security services, even if it means turning
 over the password of every client.
 
 That is one telling barometer of the security services' continuing power in
 Russia's 11-year-old democracy. In theory, Russians are entitled to as much
 privacy in their communications as Americans. Both the Russian constitution
 and a 1995 law prohibit law enforcement agencies from monitoring phone
 calls, pager messages, radio transmissions, e-mails or Internet traffic without
 a court order.
 
 But in practice, critics say, court orders are little more than legal niceties in
 Russia. An obscure set of technical regulations issued in the late 1990s
 permits total access without ever approaching a judge.
 
 The regulations are known as SORM, the Russian acronym for System for
 Operational-Investigative Activities. They require Internet providers to give their
 local FSB office whatever hardware, software and fiber-optic lines may be
 needed to tap into the provider's system and all its users.
 
 While U.S. law is based on the premise that law enforcement agencies must
 be held in check, Russian civil rights advocates say the premise of SORM is
 that Russian law enforcement can be trusted to keep itself in check.
 
 "They have all the conditions to abuse their power," said Yuri Vdovin, who
 heads Citizens' Watch, a St. Petersburg human rights organization funded by
 the Ford Foundation. "The system is on purpose constructed in such a way
 that there is no way anyone can control them. A Russian citizen is not
 protected at all."
 
 Internet providers don't like the system, especially since they promise clients
 in their contracts that their e-mail will be kept confidential. But a decade after
 perestroika, Russia is still a country where people are not inclined to fight
 city hall, much less what was once the secret police.
 
 Eugene Prygoff is the former marketing director of Kuban.net., an Internet
 provider in the southwestern Russia city of Krasnodar. He said the vast
 majority of providers are simply not willing to risk their licenses to test the
 principle of privacy. "They see no sense in putting up resistance. So they
 work out a deal with the FSB," he said.
 
 And compared with their counterparts in the West, civil rights organizations
 are still scarce and often too weak to challenge the state. Citizens' Watch,
 for instance, is working with a group of Russian lawyers to prepare a legal
 complaint against SORM. At the same time, the group's 12 employees are
 working on issues of freedom of the press, racial discrimination, juvenile
 crime, military reform and state secrecy.
 
 Not every provider ends up installing a direct line to the local FSB office,
 according to Mikhail Yakushev, head of the legal department at Global One,
 an international firm andone of Moscow's biggest Internet providers. Each one
 works out its own confidential agreement with the security service, he said.
 He stressed that his comments reflected the views of an Internet providers
 association, where he heads the legal working group, not Global One.
 
 "In practice SORM is not as abusive as it could be, because the FSB doesn't
 have enough qualified staff or special equipment to be as active as they
 could," he said.
 
 "But then again, who knows what will happen next year, or next month? The
 biggest problem is no one to control them. If there is a line, and equipment
 that allows them access, then no one can track them."
 
 Until a Supreme Court ruling in late 2000, the FSB was not even required to
 tell providers that its agents were tapping the system. The complaint in that
 case was filed by a 26-year-old St. Petersburg journalist, who said he got
 tired of waiting for civil rights groups or providers to protest.
 
 Murzakhanov, now 36 and the director of Bayard-Slavia Communications in
 Volgograd, 575 miles south of Moscow, is the only provider to publicly raise a
 fuss. Murzakhanov said that in 1998, a year after the company opened, FSB
 agents presented the firm with a plan to hook up the local FSB offices.
 
 Besides $100,000 worth of hardware, software and computer lines,
 Murzakhanov said, the FSB wanted all the tools that he had, as the
 administrator of the system. "They could very easily have read all the clients'
 passwords. And once they learned the passwords, they could have controlled
 online all the e-mail traffic," he said. "They could have read or rewritten an e-
 mail even before the receiver got it, and the user would never know."
 
 His refusal to sign the FSB's plan brought untold headaches. He said his
 business was audited or inspected at least 15 times for compliance with fire,
 epidemiological, sanitation, labor protection and tax codes.
 
 The FSB also switched off his main data transmission line, he said, forcing
 him to rely on low-quality, dial-up channels. His business license was
 suspended for six months. Only after Communications Ministry officials failed
 to show up for four court hearings did he recover it.
 
 Murzakhanov said the ministry deliberately punted. "They didn't want to
 expose the entire system of pressuring providers. They decided it was better
 to lose and to keep the cover on the system."
 
 So far, no other provider is eager to follow the Volgograd example, said
 Anatoly Levenchuk, an Internet expert in Moscow who first revealed the
 SORM requirements.
 
 "They all say his case shows all the trouble you can have if you try to oppose
 the authorities," he said.
 
 Source
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51550-2002Mar6.html
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 edited by Harkank
 published on: 2002-03-10
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